ABSTRACT In this paper, we present a price-based approach for offloading macro users to small-cells in a two-tier heterogeneous network (HetNet). We have constructively exploited the small-cell density in a HetNet to harness offloading opportunities for macro users (MUs), the goal of which is to solve two problems simultaneously. It aims to shun the MUs, who have a lower received data rate due to the interference perceived from the small-cell tier. The scheme also fends off congestion in a macrocell, by offloading macro users to the small-cell tier. We have proposed a novel threshold pricing scheme, which a macrocell adopts, with a view to influencing low data rate MUs to join a small-cell network. Small-cell networks also charge a price, which includes an access price and an interference compensation price, proportional to the number of MUs who choose the small-cells instead of the macrocellular network. We assume that the small-cells adopt existing cell range expansion techniques to accommodate MUs. We formulate an evolutionary game to model and analyze the behavioral dynamics of the large number of MUs under the proposed pricing strategies of both networks. Replicator dynamics is used to find the evolutionary equilibrium of the evolutionary game. Sequentially, we provide the proof of the existence, uniqueness and stability of the evolutionary equilibrium through extensive analysis. Numerical results are provided to demonstrate that the proposed pricing strategies are able to shape the network dynamics by fine-tuning the rate-threshold and price. The ability to control the macrocell population share by itself with an application of the proposed pricing scheme remains the prime contribution of this paper.
I. INTRODUCTION
The meteoric rise in popularity of media-rich devices (smartphones, tablets etc.) has led to an increased capacity demand from the cellular wireless networks. Fifth-generation (5G) radio access technology has been envisioned in order to meet the exponential capacity growth. It aims to provide a 10 Gb/s data rate per user and promises a 1000-fold capacity gain over contemporary wireless networks [1] . Since the state-of-theart wireless technologies are already operating approximately around the Shannon limit [2] , limited capacity gain can be extracted with existing cell structures and frequency allocation techniques. 5G radio access technology aims to utilize a three-dimensional capacity model (bits per second × Hertz × cells per square kilometer) [3] , which gives a clear indication that the so called capacity gain can be achieved by increasing the number of cells per square kilometer. Indeed, cell densification has been earmarked for generating additional capacity gain for a 5G wireless network [4] . It ensures efficient use of the limited spectrum resources by exploiting spatial spectrum reuse. This idea has been investigated in [5] , where it has been proved that the densification of base stations can increase the spectral efficiency (SE) of served users with a certain user outage constraint. Consequently, small-cells, e.g. microcells, picocells, femtocells and relays, have been developed to provide a better end-user experience.
Small-cell deployment is not only advantageous in providing a critical boost in network capacity, but it is also beneficial in terms of generating revenue for mobile operators since users are willing to pay for better quality of experience (QoE). Major mobile operators, worldwide (AT&T, Verizon Wireless in USA; Korea Telecom, SK Telecom in South Korea; T-mobile, Vodafone in Europe; NTT DoCoMo in Japan; and Unicom in China) have already started to roll out small-cell services to their clients. As a result, small-cells are expected to be utilized heavily in the future, especially in 5G communication networks. They will generally be deployed in macrocells, creating what are known as heterogeneous networks (HetNets). However, this random and dense deployment of small-cell base stations (SBSs) will introduce new challenges in HetNet interference management and load distribution.
A. INTERFERENCE ISSUES IN HETNETS
The underlying challenges for interference management in HetNets have been elaborated in existing research [6] - [11] . Three major aspects give rise to severe interference in HetNets: i) underlay spectrum access based deployment; ii) random and dense deployment; iii) the access strategy of small-cells. Macrocell base stations (MBSs) and SBSs share the same spectrum (sub-bands) in underlay spectrum access; however, they transmit with different power levels which results in cross-tier interference [6] between the macrocell and small-cell tiers in the uplink and downlink [7] . Allocating dedicated frequency channels for small-cells would eliminate cross-tier interference, however, spectrum sharing is preferred by the operators since the radio frequency spectrum is limited. SBSs are generally deployed by end-users on a plug-and-play basis for a seamless network experience [8] . Therefore randomness in deployment and impromptu activation of SBSs pose a concern for macro users since they do not have any prior knowledge about those SBSs. Furthermore, there are possibilities of SBSs creating interference hotspots, which are detrimental enough to create dead zones for macro users (MUs) in their downlink and uplink as discussed in [6] and [7] . SBS densification, coupled with underlay spectrum access, thus increases the number of such interference hotspots inside a macrocellular network.
Selecting the appropriate mode of access of small-cell users has become a pressing concern due to the complicated interference dynamics, achievable subscriber throughput and overall network throughput. SBSs generally have unused resources [9] since the small-cell load varies temporally depending on its subscribers' activation preferences. Therefore, SBS resources can be utilized efficiently to manage interference in HetNets. Such a scenario has been analyzed in [10] - [12] , stressing the fact that an open access strategy does alleviate cross-tier interference. In addition, such deployment also increases the SE of a macrocellular network, as well as user QoE. The downside of such deployment is that it does not guarantee subscriber throughput. Furthermore, small-cell subscribers may not be willing to deploy them as open access, paying the expense of backhaul network and energy cost. As a result, SBSs are generally deployed as closed access by its subscribers, which restricts unsubscribed user (macro user) access to them. This access strategy, however, generates severe interference towards MUs [10] . In fact, aggregated cross-tier interference from nearby smallcells reduces the SE of MUs in their downlink. Recently, hybrid access mode has been studied in [13] and [14] allowing a limited number of MUs to connect with small-cells. This access mode guarantees subscribers' throughput while reducing co-channel interference. However, a trade-off exists between achievable subscriber throughput and total network throughput in hybrid access mode.
B. MOTIVATION
In summary, the role of the small-cell has become more important than ever for managing interference in dense HetNets. The number of both MUs and SBSs is expected to increase in 5G HetNets. Small-cells, therefore, must share the burden of macrocells by accepting arbitrarily nearby MUs. In fact, dense small-cell networks can provide additional spectrum opportunities for MUs, assuming that they are deployed in hybrid access. Offloading thus comes in to the fray as a possible solution, where a portion of MUs join small-cells instead of macrocells to maximize their data rate. Indeed, it provides a win-win scenario for both macrocells and small-cells, where a macrocell can avoid dealing with a serious crosstier interference problem by offloading MUs to their serious interferer. In addition to interference reduction, offloading provides an inexpensive solution for network operators to expand network capacities by leveraging SBSs' resources. Small-cells on the other hand, can benefit by selling their unused resources to MUs and increasing their individual SE. The widely used RSS-based offloading scheme can overload macrocells [15] . In bias-based offloading schemes, users associated with small-cells can be subjected to unfavourable channels [6] . Offloaded users can also suffer from interference from nearby macrocells [16] . In addition, both schemes lead to inefficient offloading, since they cannot guarantee that a certain number of MUs will always be offloaded to small-cells. Recently proposed game theory based network selection algorithms also cannot guarantee how many MUs will select a small-cell. The decisions of MUs on SBS selection largely depends on an SBS's price for per unit resource. Macrocell pricing strategies lack control mechanisms, which induces offloading. Therefore, it raises a crucial question: how can a macrocell efficiently control its population share? This motivates us to design a network selection algorithm based on a novel pricing function, enabling a macrocell to control its population share. Our proposed algorithm guarantees that a certain percentage of the macrocell population, i.e. MUs, will be offloaded to small-cells as soon as the data rate per macrocell-associated user falls below a threshold.
C. CONTRIBUTIONS
In this paper, we present a novel price-based offloading strategy in order to provide a necessary framework for macrocells to control their population share. The price function combines two different pricing strategies, activated in two different cases. A macrocell activates linear pricing if its population share is small. Each MU pays a price to the macrocell which is proportional to the average data rate of that macrocellular network. As the population share of the macrocell network increases, the average data rate per user decreases. The crosstier interference suffered by the MUs due to the proximity to SBSs, further reduce the average data rate per user. Therefore, the payment of each MU decreases under those two circumstances. As a result, a macrocell therefore generates less revenue when the both interference and the number of macro users are large. By analyzing this phenomenon, we have introduced a threshold price in the macrocell price function. As soon as the average data rate falls below a certain threshold, called the rate-threshold, the second price component is activated by a macrocell. We denote this price component as the threshold price. The rate-threshold thus works as the trigger for threshold price activation. Once the threshold price is activated, each MU has to pay a higher price than the linear price to remain in the macrocellular network. This motivates MUs to join nearby SBSs. In this process, a portion of the macrocell population is offloaded to its serious interferer. By doing so they avoid paying a high cost for a lesser resource (data rate) and avoid cross-tier interference as well. The numerical value of the rate-threshold can be fine-tuned by a macrocell to have an optimum population share with a view to minimizing cross-tier interference and congestion.
SBSs, on the other hand, can increase their individual utility by selling redundant resources to MUs. We assume that small-cells adopt the existing cell range expansion (CRE) techniques to accommodate MUs. Small-cell pricing strategy includes an access price and interference compensation. The access price is a fixed price paid for small-cell association. SBSs increase their transmit power by a certain level to increase their coverage. This allows MUs to connect with their nearest SBS seamlessly. However, increasing transmit power will cause cross-tier interference. The interference compensation thus acts as a penalty for users who choose a small-cell instead of a macrocell. Thus it restricts distant MUs from joining a small-cell because of the cost and data rate trade-off. The numerical value of the interference compensation is proportional to the number of active MUs who choose small-cells for association.
Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) provides an analytic framework for understanding competitive decision making where large numbers of players with different strategies interact in a dynamic scenario. In our model, MUs are the players that interact with an MBS and SBSs for association. In this paper, we model this interaction with EGT. MUs adapt to their choices based on the payoff they receive and will eventually distribute across the two-tier network. In other words, they will select either an SBS or an MBS based on the strategy, whichever yields them the higher payoff. Numerical results are provided by applying different network settings to emphasize the role of the proposed pricing strategies in offloading MUs to small-cells in order to shape network dynamics.
The proposed pricing algorithms certainly provide an efficient way for network operators to offload MUs to SBSs. In an effort to summarize our contributions in this paper the following points are to be noted:
• Pricing mechanisms: We have devised a novel price function for the macrocell by combining two different pricing strategies that enables macrocell-controlled offloading in a dense HetNet environment. The proposed pricing strategy of small-cells includes an access price and interference price compensation.
• Evolutionary network dynamics: We provide an EGTbased framework for modeling MU behaviour under the proposed macrocell and small-cell pricing strategies. We study the evolutionary dynamics of the network selection game and show that it converges to the evolutionary equilibrium. We also prove that the evolutionary equilibrium is asymptotically stable.
• Performance analysis: We show that the proposed macrocell pricing strategy is able to control its population share efficiently by tuning the value of the ratethreshold. On the other hand, small-cells are able to accommodate a portion of the MUs as well as restrict distant MUs from joining them.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Related research work is described in Section II. The system model in Section III includes symbol notation, along with the network model, followed by the pricing strategies of macrocell and small-cells. Section IV provides a brief synopsis of EGT. EGT for network selection is modeled in Section V, along with a detailed analysis of equilibrium existence, uniqueness and stability. Section VI presents the results obtained for different parameter settings, followed by the conclusion in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORKS
SBSs have been envisioned to provide a necessary infrastructure for offloading when 5G networks finally roll out. Recently, various literature has been published on offloading for HetNets, which can be divided broadly into the following categories.
A. GAME THEORY BASED OFFLOADING Energy aware cooperative capacity offload is proposed in [17] , for cell-edge MUs, who suffer from throughput degradation due to cross-tier interference. These MUs are offloaded to SBSs to enhance their QoE. The joint base station association and power control problem can be formulated as a Nash bargaining game to perform capacity offloading. Game theory based network selection techniques have been studied rigorously in [18] - [20] with a view to reducing macrocell load. An EGT-based network selection algorithm is presented in [18] to avoid overloading a particular network, where users select from an IEEE 802.16, an IEEE 802.11 and a CDMA cellular network. A two-level game model is proposed in [19] , in order to distribute the load (macro users) inside the coverage area of a HetNet. Each small-cell determines the amount of open access bandwidth based on the incentive offered by the macrocell. Both networks then compete for macro users in the HetNet by declaring a price for their resources. This pricing interaction is then modeled using a dynamic Stackelberg game as an upper-level game. Users on the other hand choose either of the two networks based on the price offered by each network and the satisfaction level. EGT VOLUME 6, 2018 is used for modeling user behavior in the HetNet as a lower level game to find the proportion of users who are associated with the different network tiers. Network selection is viewed as a user association problem in [20] . A population game is considered for finding the proportion of users who will be distributed in a network of multiple base stations in order to maximize their individual payoff. Three different kinds of evolutionary dynamics were evaluated to find the dynamics which converges faster to an equilibrium. Taking advantage of the fast converging property of the best response dynamics, a new algorithm called best responding user association with traffic estimation (BRUTE) was proposed. In [21] , the concept of CRE is utilized to avoid cross-tier interference by offloading interference affected MUs to small-cells. A Stackelberg game is formulated to model the interaction of macrocells selling bandwidth to small-cells so that victim MUs can be served by the small-cells. A three stage Stackelberg game framework is provided in [22] , where spectrum leasing and hybrid accessing are jointly considered to offload MUs to femtocells. It has been shown that spectrum leasing and hybrid accessing jointly improve the utility of both tiers.
B. NON-GAME THEORY BASED OFFLOADING
User association schemes akin to network selection schemes have been proposed in [15] , [16] , and [23] with a view to offloading MUs in HetNets. The conventional received signal strength (RSS) based user association scheme [15] is not suitable for HetNets due to the variable power levels between macrocell base stations (MBSs) and SBSs. Users will always connect to the base station with the higher transmit power in this process. As a consequence, a large proportion of users will always end up associating with macrocells. Low power SBSs, along with their low antenna gain, will result in lightly loaded small-cells. Therefore mutual interference between macro users and small-cells will always exist. In order to overcome the inefficiency of the RSS-based offloading technique, bias-based cell range expansion (CRE) has been proposed in [16] and [23] , where SBSs artificially increase their transmission power by adding a positive bias to the transmitted signals. Nevertheless users offloaded to biased base stations will suffer from strong interference from nearby macrocells [16] , as well as unfavorable channels from biased base stations [6] . In addition, the bias value needs to be optimized carefully, since there exists a trade-off between the number of offloaded users and the system throughput.
Higher bias values may attract more MUs, which will in turn overload small-cells. In [24] a load-aware cell association method is adopted for downlink HetNets, where MUs are pushed onto lightly loaded small-cell tiers even if those smallcells offer a small instantaneous signal to interference plus noise ratio (SINR). A classic optimization theory is used to jointly formulate the cell association and resource allocation problem, where a general utility maximization problem is solved by using a dual decomposition technique. 
III. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we first give the notation of important parameters. After that the network model is elaborated, with necessary assumptions. Finally we explain the proposed pricing function in Section III-C.
A. NOTATION SUMMARY
The notation used is summarized in Table 1 .
B. NETWORK MODEL AND ASSUMPTION
A long term evolution (LTE) cellular network is considered, comprising of a single macrocell and a large number of densely deployed small-cells overlaid inside the macrocell coverage area as shown in Fig. 1 . We denote the macrocell index as M and the set of SBSs in the HetNet as B =
., N } denotes the set of MUs in the HetNet that can connect either with an SBS or the macrocell. We assume that small-cells are operated in hybrid access manner in order to allow MUs to join them. Furthermore, small-cells are deployed in underlay spectrum access mode to ensure efficient spectrum reuse and provide good transmission performance due to favorable channel characteristics. Both the macrocell and the SBSs are connected to the core network with wired backhaul links such as optical fiber. The total data rate offered by the macrocell is R M , shared equally among MUs, and R S is the data rate offered to MUs by each small-cell.
The snapshot of our considered network model given by Fig. 1 demonstrates the interference scenario in the HetNet.
The existence of active SBSs near to MUs can result in detrimental interference, as an MU 1 is subjected to downlink cross-tier inteference from SBS 1 , while MU 2 perceives interference from both SBS 1 and SBS 2 . The severity of perceived interference by an MU on its downlink largely depends on the proximity to SBSs, i.e. the distance between an MU and SBSs. For example: SBS 2 is the most serious interferer for MU 2 , though MU 2 perceives weak interference from SBS 1 . Therefore, throughout the HetNet, MUs staying near to an SBS will suffer from interference, which in turn will reduce their received data rate. We assume that the macrocell has a limited bandwidth which is equally shared among MUs. Consequently, when the number of MUs in the macrocellular network increases, the data rate per user decreases. In a practical LTE cellular network the downlink received data rate of a user depends on the number of assigned physical resource blocks (PRBs) and received signal-to-interferenceplus-noise-ratio (SINR). For example: if there are 5 users and 10 available PRBs, each user can have a maximum allocation of 2 PRBs. On the other hand, if there are 10 users, each user can get a maximum allocation of 1 PRB. Therefore the average data rate per user depends on the number of users present in the network and instantaneous SINR. Thus interference and the number of MUs jointly affect the data rate of MUs when they are in the macrocellular network. SBSs on the other hand, provide offloading opportunities for those MUs based on the assumption that SBSs have unused resource [9] . We assume that SBSs adopt an existing cell range expansion (CRE) technique such as power control to accommodate MUs. Such a case is demonstrated by the blue dotted line in Fig. 1 , which indicates the expanded coverage area of an SBS. We assume that SBSs are allowed to increase their transmission power to a certain level to perform CRE. However, this results in interference to distant MUs as shown in Fig. 1 . SBS 3 adjusts its transmission power to accommodate MU 3 . Note that MU 4 is far enough to perceive crosstier interference, but it is not close enough to be offloaded to SBSs. Taking these cases into consideration, both a macrocell and a small-cell pricing strategy is devised in this paper.
In the following sub-section we detail our proposed pricing scheme.
C. PRICING STRATEGIES
Pricing any resource can be viewed as a control mechanism. The most commonly used pricing strategy is fixed price, where users pay a fixed charge for given amount of resource [19] , [25] . In the linear pricing strategy a user generally pays for per unit of resource and the total amount of payment is proportional to the total amount of the resources consumed by the user. For example: payment of a user to the network operator increases linearly if the total number of users increases in that network [18] . However, we took a novel approach while formulating the price function for the network resource, detailed as follows: 
1) MACROCELL PRICING STRATEGY
Pricing strategies can shape the tele-traffic dynamics of the wireless network. Motivated by the potential of influencing MUs by applying the appropriate price theory, we propose the following price function:
where C M is the macrocell's price function. By definition x + is given by:
C M is comprised of two types of price components, namely a threshold price and a linear price. C l represents the linear price component and is equivalent to C f (R − R τ ) + .R and R τ represent the average macrocell data rate and rate-threshold respectively. C f is a fixed cost. C τ is the threshold price component and is defined as C τ = C f R τ . The graphical representation of the price function is given in Fig. 2 . Equation (1) yields two different cases:
|N M | , the value of which depends on the number of MUs connected with the macrocell. |N M | is the cardinality of set N M , denoting the total number of MUs that select the macrocell for association. We see that the macrocell adopts a linear pricing strategy whenR > R τ . Each user willing to connect with a macrocell pays price C M = C l , which varies linearly with the increase or decrease in the average data rate.
Case 2: (R − R τ ) < 0
The macrocell thus adopts the threshold pricing strategy when R < R τ . The numerical value of the threshold price component depends on the rate-threshold R τ . The function of this rate-threshold is very crucial in the context of offloading, since it predominantly controls the macrocell population share. Higher values of R τ ensure activation of the threshold price component for smaller numbers of MUs in the macrocell. On the other hand, by lowering R τ a macrocell can entice more MUs to remain connected with the macrocell. Therefore, the macrocell can control its population share (PS) by changing R τ . Note that the macrocell needs to keep track of its population share in order to make a decision about the rate-threshold.
2) SMALL-CELL PRICING STRATEGY
The pricing strategy of a small-cell is given by:
where C a , C i are the access price and the interference price respectively. Both are a fixed charge. |N S | is the cardinality of set N S , denoting the total number of MUs that select a small-cell for association. Therefore the total payment of a user selecting a small-cell depends on the number of users that choose the small-cell for association. The interference compensation serves two purposes. Firstly, it restricts a smallcell from being overcrowded. Secondly, it prevents a smallcell from increasing its transmission power abruptly to attract distant MUs. We assume that the macrocell feeds back the location information of the MUs via a common control channel to small-cells to operate the pricing strategy and perform CRE.
IV. INTRODUCTION TO EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY
In this section we first introduce the basic concept of EGT and evolutionary stable strategy (ESS). We also briefly discuss replicator dynamics, which provides a deterministic way to calculate the evolutionary equilibrium.
A. EVOLUTIONARY GAME An evolutionary game mathematically models the concept of evolution by natural selection. It considers a large population of players that randomly interact with each other based on a pre-programmed strategy. The population evolves in such a way that the frequency with which a particular decision is made can change over time in response to the decisions made by all individuals. Initially, the population may consist of players using different strategies. The payoff to an individual adopting a strategy is defined as the fitness for that type in the current population. The proportion of a population programmed with a particular strategy will increase if they have a higher fitness than the rest of the population. Therefore, players are likely to switch to those strategies that give better payoffs and move away from those that give poor payoffs. In this manner, those strategies that give a lower payoff are out-competed.
Definition 1: An evolutionary game can be defined as G = (N , S, π(S i ) S i ∈X ) where N is the set of players which constitute the population in an evolutionary game, S is the set of all strategies and π (S i ) S i ∈S is the payoff obtained by using strategy S i .

B. EVOLUTIONARY STABLE STRATEGY (ESS)
The concept of an ESS arose from the context of players' behavior where a large population of players who are repeatedly and randomly matched in pairs play a game. In fact, ESS was first presented by Maynard Smith and Price via a seminal paper [26] for a monomorphic population [27] , [28] . Note that a population of an evolutionary game is called monomorphic if every player adopts the same strategy and polymorphic if a proportion of the population has a different strategy, i.e. more than one strategy is present. The underlying assumptions of an ESS therefore are: i) players choose their strategies from identical sets, ii) the payoff to a player choosing a particular strategy against an opponent choosing an alternative is the same regardless of the identities or characteristics of the players; and iii) players cannot make their strategy choices conditional on any characteristics. The definition of an ESS states that an ESS is a strategy such that if all the members of a population adopt it, then no mutant strategy could invade the population under the influence of natural selection. Let us consider a player using a strategy S against a player using strategyŜ. In that case, the expected payoff for the player using strategy S is π (S,Ŝ). The definition of an ESS for a monomorphic population can be expressed as
Definition 2: A strategy S * is an ESS if and only if for all, S = S
Condition 1) defines the equilibrium condition and states that S * is the best response strategy to itself and is hence a Nash equilibrium (NE). On the other hand, condition 2) is interpreted as a stability condition. Suppose that the incumbents play S * and mutants play S. Then both conditions ensure that as long as the fraction of mutants playing S is not too large, the average payoff to S will fall short of that to S * . However, the above definition of an ESS is valid for a monomorphic population, in which every player uses the same strategy. For a polymorphic population, the specific type of evolutionary dynamics [28] called replicator dynamics is used to capture the evolution of a particular strategy in an evolutionary game. In the next section we give an overview of replicator dynamics.
C. REPLICATOR DYNAMICS
The replicator dynamics introduced by Taylor and Jonker [29] reflects the role of a selection mechanism, i.e. a strategy in an evolutionary process. It is expressed as a system of ordinary differential equations (ODE) which does not consider mutations at all. Consider a large population of individuals, where each individual is programmed to adopt any of the pure strategies from the pure strategy set, S = {1, . . . , S}. Suppose that an individual adopts a pure strategy i, such that i ∈ S. The population share of a particular strategy denotes the proportion of individuals in the total population that have adopted that strategy. Therefore, the population share of strategy i is x i . The vector X = {x 1 x 2 . . . x s } is called the population state, which includes the population share of all the strategies, x i ∈ X, where |S| i=1,i∈S x i = 1 is satisfied. Individuals with fixed strategies randomly interact with other individuals. Based on the context of the game, the population share of those strategies that a yield a higher payoff will increase in proportion, which imitates the process of natural selection. The rate of a particular strategy adaptation of a group in the population is given by the replicator dynamics, expressed in terms of ODEs [30] as:
where π i is the payoff of each individual choosing strategy i andπ is the average payoff of the entire population, which is given by:π
Thus the replicator dynamics presented by (6) states that the population share of strategy i will increase if the payoff associated with strategy i is higher than the average payoff, (i.e. π i >π ).
V. NETWORK SELECTION GAME: MODELING THE EVOLUTION OF MUs
A. ESSENCE OF THE NETWORK SELECTION GAME
In this section, we present the framework of the evolutionary game for network selection with our proposed pricing strategies. The essence of the network selection game is as follows: Players: The set of MUs are defined by N = {1, 2, . . . , N } are the players of the game.
Set of Strategies: The MUs will select either the macrocell or any of the small-cells, whichever yields them the highest payoff under the pricing strategies of both networks. We define the set of strategies for each type of player as
Population Share (PS): The set of MUs constitutes the population in an evolutionary game. The players will adopt one of the two strategies and they will be distributed across the twotier network accordingly. We assume that a centralized controller, for example a macrocell, can collect and relay required information (the price and the population share of each tier) from/to every MUs through a common control channel [18] . A portion of the MUs will select the macrocell, i.e., adopt strategy S M for association. Therefore the population share (PS) of MUs for macrocell selection is defined as:
where |N M | is the cardinality of set N M ; N M ∈ N and N M ⊂ N . Similarly the PS of MUs who opt to select small-cells for association, is defined as:
where |N S | is the cardinality of set N S ; N S ∈ N and N S ⊂ N , which denotes the number of MUs, willing to connect with a small-cell. Here X M + X S = 1. Payoff Function: According to EGT, the payoff function or fitness of a player (MU) quantifies the amount of profit it could gain by adopting a particular strategy. We use the following non-increasing function in the interval of X M ∈ [0, 1] to obtain the payoff of an MU (using strategy S M ) for selecting a macrocell:
where the first component of the payoff function is called the utility which is achieved by a MU for selecting a macrocell for association, in which ω M is the weighting factor for macrocell selection and R M is the total data rate provided by the macrocell. The second term, C M , is the cost incurred by an MU for receiving the service of the macrocell. We use the following non-increasing function in the interval of X S ∈ [0, 1] to quantify the payoff of an MU (using strategy S s ) for selecting a small-cell:
where ω S is the weighting factor of small-cells, R S is the total data rate provided by the small-cell and C S , is the cost incurred by an MU for receiving the service of the small-cell. The payoff function of an MU selecting a small-cell can be written as a function of the macrocell PS (X M ). Note that the payoff function now becomes a non-decreasing function in the interval of X M ∈ [0, 1] and after applying (5), as: (12) where |N S | = |N |(1 − X M ).
B. NETWORK SELECTION DYNAMICS AND EQUILIBRIUM COMPUTATION
In this section, we derive the replicator dynamics to compute the evolutionary equilibrium, which reflects how MUs will distribute across the two-tier network after strategic interaction with the macrocell and small-cells. The goal is to capture the interplay of MUs with the macrocell and smallcell network by determining the parameters X M , X S for the two different cases, i.e. for case 1 and case 2 respectively, as explained in Section III. These parameters give the proportion of MUs that choose a macrocell or a small-cell, respectively, under the proposed pricing functions. The replicator dynamics can be written as:
where σ is the evolutionary speed constant and explains how fast an evolutionary game will approach towards the convergence,π is the average payoff andπ
We now analyze the network selection dynamics by applying the two types of price function.
1) SELECTION DYNAMICS IN CASE 1
Note that the macrocell price function is comprised of two different pricing strategies. Activation of each pricing strategy depends upon the number of MUs associated in a macrocellular network. Inserting (3) into (13) gives the payoff of an MU for macrocell association in case 1 as:
The replicator dynamics can be written as:
The equilibrium point of an evolutionary game can be obtained by setting the left-hand side of the replicator dynamics (15) to zero, i.e.,Ẋ M = 0. The solutions X * M = 0 and X * M = 1 are called trivial fixed points, also known as boundary evolutionary equilibria of the evolutionary game. The boundary evolutionary equilibria are not stable, since any small perturbation will cause the system to deviate from the equilibrium state [31] . Non-trivial fixed points are given by the following equation: (16) Equation (16) finally takes the following form:
Equation (17) is a cubic and has 3 roots, i.e. the replicator dynamics has three more fixed points. Note that any fixed point X * M of the replicator dynamics is feasible if it is an interior evolutionary equilibrium. The interior evolutionary equilibrium x i is defined by the case when x i ∈ (0, 1), ∀i ∈ S. In order to find the closed form expression of the feasible fixed points, the cubic needs to be solved. However, solving the cubic algebraically is not insightful. Instead, we show that a feasible fixed point exists by providing a necessary proof using the existence Theorem 1 in Section V-C.
2) SELECTION DYNAMICS IN CASE 2
When the threshold price is active, i.e., in case 2, the payoff of an MU is found by substituting equation (4) in equation (13):
The network selection dynamics take the following form when the threshold price is active:
Similarly, by settingẊ M = 0, we find two trivial fixed points, X * M = 0 and X * M = 1, as well as the following cubic equation:
By solving (20) , three more fixed points can be obtained for case 2. However they must each satisfy the condition of interior evolutionary equilibrium to be considered as a feasible solution. For the reason outlined in Case 1, we aim to prove that a solution indeed exists in the following section by rigorously analyzing the payoff functions.
C. EXISTENCE OF EVOLUTIONARY EQUILIBRIUM
The concepts of existence and uniqueness are applied in order to prove that the equilibrium points indeed exist. Recall the general equation (10), which describes the payoff for each user connecting to a macrocell. Substitute the value of C M in (10) to give:
Therefore we have to find the solution of the evolutionary game defined as:
where
The replicator dynamics can thus be expressed as:
, is a function of X M , that defines the difference between the macrocell and small-cell payoffs. At equilibrium,Ẋ M = 0, Therefore settingẊ M = 0 yields (X M ) = 0 and also gives 0 and 1 as fixed points of the replicator dynamics. We therefore concentrate on the following equation:
Suppose that X * M is a fixed point of the replicator dynamics (23), achieved by solving equation (24) 
M is an interior evolutionary equilibrium, it will eventually be a feasible solution of evolutionary game G. Thus X * M will be an interior evolutionary equilibrium if and only if X * M ∈ (0, 1). The following theorem can be obtained. (23) .
Proof: For µ large enough and small enough we can write the following inequalities:
and
Recalling that both payoff functions π M (X M ) and π S (X M ) are bounded between 0 and 1, both (25) and (26) follow because they are continuous and approach to infinity at 0 and 1 respectively. Therefore the following inequalities are true based on the above assumptions:
and (27) and (28) follow continuity. Subtracting (25) from (27) gives:
By applying the equilibrium condition the following is obtained:
As a result, the inequality defined by equation (38) is satisfied. Thus we can claim thatL(X M ) < 0 when X M − X * M > 0 and X M − X * M < 0. Therefore both conditions (b) and (c) hold and the solution of the replicator dynamics X * M is asymptotically stable. This completes the proof.
VI. ANALYTICAL RESULTS
This section analyzes the numerical results obtained from solving the network selection dynamics under the proposed pricing strategies. We observe how different parameters such as rate-threshold R τ and the small-cell interference price C i shape the network dynamics by influencing the behavior of MUs. Before analyzing the results, the values of the parameters used in simulations are listed: σ = 0.1, ω M = 1, ω S = 0.9, R S = 0.6, R M = 1, C f = 0.30, C a = 0.002, C i = 0.0005 and N = 100.
A. ANALYSIS OF THE MACROCELL COST FUNCTION
The characteristics of the proposed macrocell price function are obtained by simulating (1) . The results demonstrate the mechanism of threshold price activation when the macrocell PS increases. The macrocell price function is plotted in Fig. 3 and compared against case 1 and case 2, using the value of R τ = 0.05. Case 1, plotted by the red line, denotes the scenario where the price function increases or decreases linearly with respect to the average data rate achieved by the MUs. The macrocell adopts the linear pricing strategy as long as the macrocell PS remains below 0.2. Case 2, as shown by the blue line in Fig. 3 , denotes the condition where the macrocell adopts the threshold price, the value of which can be scaled by using R τ . As soon as the PS increases above 0.2 the proposed price function switches to case 2. The inset in Fig. 3 exhibits the proposed price function to show clearly the triggering point of the threshold price. The activation of the threshold price can be controlled by scaling R τ for different PS settings. Later we validate by appropriate simulation that this threshold pricing strategy indeed influences MUs to connect with the small-cell tier. Fig. 4 gives the cell selection dynamics of the evolutionary game in terms of payoff functions. We have calculated the payoffs for an MU for selecting either a small-cell or the macrocell and plotted them against PS. Note that R τ = 0.05 and C i = 0.0005. The payoff for an MU for macrocell selection decreases for both cases with the increase of macrocell PS. An MU's payoff for both case 1 and case 2 declines sharply as PS increases and intersects the small-cell payoff at a PS of 0.91 and 0.88, respectively. Note that these are macrocell PSs, i.e. X M = 0.91 for case 1 and X M = 0.88 for case 2. The average payoff increases linearly for both cases and also intersects the small-cell payoff function when the macrocell PS is 0.91 and 0.88, respectively. These are the equilibrium points of the network selection game. Thus we observe a contrasting phenomenon while analyzing the equilibrium of the evolutionary game. The macrocell PS at the equilibrium never changes for the linear pricing strategy. On the contrary changing the rate-threshold in the threshold pricing strategy changes the equilibrium to an another stationary point and allows the macrocell to offload a significant portion of the MUs to the small-cell tier. Later we show that by tuning R τ a larger chunk of MUs can be offloaded to the small-cell tier. The insets in Fig. 4 show the sudden changes in MU payoff due to activation of the threshold price. Here, the activation of the threshold price offloads more than 3% of MUs to the small-cell tier.
B. ANALYSIS OF CELL SELECTION DYNAMICS 1) PAYOFF DYNAMICS
2) CONVERGENCE
In this section, the convergence of the cell selection dynamics of the proposed evolutionary game is analyzed for the corresponding cases using the parameter values R τ = 0.05 and C i = 0.0005. In both cases, the replicator dynamics are simulated with the PS of both macrocell and small-cells plotted against time, given by Fig. 5 . This gives us an idea how MUs reach a stationary solution and are distributed throughout the two-tier HetNet. At the start of the simulation the macrocell PS is 0.2. It is observed that the cell selection game approaches convergence as soon as its PS reaches 0.91 and 0.88 for case 1 and case 2, respectively. Note that the value of σ affects the rate of convergence. By increasing the value of σ a faster convergence can be expected.
C. EFFECT OF RATE-THRESHOLD
In this section, an extensive analysis is presented of the effect of the rate-threshold R τ on MU payoff and network population share. The simulation results provide an insight on how R τ influences an MUs' decision in making network selection. Fig. 6(a) and Fig. 6(b) show the reduction in the MU payoff for both cases. However, activation of the threshold price (C f R τ ) lowers the MU payoff further. The value of the threshold price is scaled by R τ . As a result, MUs tend to associate with small-cells. Fig. 6(a) shows that activation of the threshold price lowers the macrocell PS by 3%. Fig. 6(b) shows the scenario, where the macrocell payoff for case 2 is significantly lower than the payoff achieved with case 1. Note that R τ = 0.15 is used for simulation. The high value of the threshold price reduces the MU payoff so that a larger chunk of MUs select small-cells. Observe that macrocell PS is 0.74 when the threshold price is active. Therefore, by increasing R τ the macrocell is able to offload 15% more MUs to the small-cells compared to case 1 (linear pricing strategy), where the macrocell PS is 0.91. The effect of rate-threshold is now understandable by comparing the payoffs of case 1 and proposed price function from Fig. 6(a) and Fig. 6(b) . Increasing the rate-threshold decreases the payoffs for both case 2 and the proposed price function. Also, by increasing the rate-threshold three times from R τ = 0.05 to R τ = 0.15, more than 15% of the MUs can be offloaded to the small-cell tier.
1) PAYOFF FUNCTIONS
2) PS
Now we analyze the effect of the rate-threshold on the macrocell's PS. Fig. 7 shows the convergence of the replicator dynamics for corresponding functions. The macrocell's PS, with the proposed price function for the rate-threshold of 0.15 and 0.25, are 0.74 and 0.32 respectively. On the other hand, case 1 (linear pricing strategy) can not affect the macrocell PS. We find the macrocell PS with case 1 is 0.91 for all ratethresholds settings.
The payoffs and PS are listed in Table 2 for different values of R τ to emphasize the effect of R τ on the network dynamics as well as how the tuning of R τ offloads MUs to the small-cell tier.
D. EFFECT OF SMALL-CELL INTERFERENCE PRICING ON NETWORK SELECTION DYNAMICS
Here the findings about small-cell interference pricing and how it shapes the network dynamics are presented. The goal of implementing interference pricing as a small-cell pricing strategy is to restrict distant MUs from connecting with a small-cell. Small-cells are only allowed to increase their transmission power to a fixed level so that nearby MUs can connect with them.
In the studies conducted R τ was fixed at 0.05 and C i was varied. As shown in Fig. 8(a) , the macrocell PS for both case 1 and case 2 are 0.6023 and 0.4412 at C i = 0. It is observed that a large group of users connect to small-cells if the interference price is not activated. For C i = 0.0001, the PS of the macrocell for case 1 and case 2 respectively are 0.747 and 0.6022. As the interference price increases, a change in the network dynamics is seen with more users tending to join the macrocell. Note that the difference in the macrocell PS between case 1 and case 2 is due to the threshold N. Saha, R. Vesilo: Evolutionary Game Theory Approach for Joint Offloading and Interference Management price as shown in Fig 8(a), Fig. 8(b) and Fig. 8(c) . Due to the threshold price, the macrocell PS for case 2 is significantly lower than in case 1. As C i is increased tenfold from 0.0001 to 0.001, the macrocell PS for case 1 and case 2 becomes 0.9506 and 0.9447, respectively. The jump in the macrocell PS for both cases in Fig. 8(c) is due to the high interference price charged by a small-cell. An interesting observation is that, as the small-cell interference price becomes higher, the influence of the threshold price on the macrocell PS reduces. As a result the macrocell PS achieved for case 1 and case 2 is almost the same.
E. AVERAGE DATA RATE PERFORMANCE
Here we investigate the effect of the rate-threshold and the interference pricing on the average data rate performance of the MUs. Fig. 9 shows the impact of the ratethreshold on average data rate per MU. We run the simulation by varying the rate-threshold only and record each of the equilibrium points, i.e. the macrocell PS corresponding to the rate-threshold. We then compute the average data rate per MU with respect to the previously recorded macrocell PS and plot them against the rate-threshold. The majority of MUs choose the macrocell at the lower value of rate-threshold and it is the lowest at R τ = 0.02. As a result the average data rate per user for macrocell association is very low. On the contrary the average data rate per user for small-cell association is the largest for R τ = 0.02. We observe that a higher value of ratethreshold pushes more MUs to small-cells. As a result the average data rate per MU drops considerably for small-cell association. Fig. 10 shows the effect of interference pricing on the average data rate per MU. In this case we vary the interference price and record the shift in the equilibrium. We observe that the average data rate per MU for small-cell association remains lowest when the value of interference price is low, i.e. when C i = 0.0001. This is due to the fact that low interference price motivates more users to select smallcells for association. Consequently the average data rate per MU suffers since a very large proportion of MUs select the small-cell tier. On the contrary the macrocell PS increases when the interference price increases.
VII. CONCLUSION
To the best of our knowledge, most of the research literature opts for either fixed price or linear price for charging MUs. By contrast, we have proposed a new macrocell price function, which combines a linear pricing strategy with a threshold pricing strategy. The pricing strategy is devised in a way that a macrocell is able to offload a portion of its users to smallcells effectively. The small-cell pricing strategy is formulated in a way that it restricts a large group of MUs from joining the small-cell tier. The introduction of a rate-threshold in the threshold pricing strategy, provides a macrocell with a degree of freedom for scaling the number of MUs in a two-tier HetNet. Furthermore the rate-threshold and the interference price of a small-cell can be optimized to have the optimum PS in either tier of HetNet. This remains the future work of this paper.
